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Abstract
We prove that in a general zero-sum repeated game where the first player is more informed than the
second player and controls the evolution of information on the state, the uniform value exists. This re-
sult extends previous results on Markov decision processes with partial observation (Rosenberg, Solan,
Vieille [11]), and repeated games with an informed controller (Renault [10]). Our formal definition of
a more informed player is more general than the inclusion of signals, allowing therefore for imperfect
monitoring of actions. We construct an auxiliary stochastic game whose state space is the set of second
order beliefs of player 2 (beliefs about beliefs of player 1 on the true state variable of the initial game)
with perfect monitoring and we prove it has a value by using a result of Renault [10]. A key element
in this work is to prove that player 1 can use strategies of the auxiliary game in the initial game in
our general framework, which allows to deduce that the value of the auxiliary game is also the value
of our initial repeated game by using classical arguments.
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1 Introduction
Zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information were introduced by Aumann and
Maschler in 1966 [1] in order to study repeated interactions between two players having a
different information. The authors also introduced a notion of value for these games usually
called uniform value and proved its existence for games with incomplete information on one
side. Mertens and Neyman [4] proved that the uniform value exists for finite stochastic games
and several works were devoted since then to prove the existence of the uniform value for some
subclasses of the general model of repeated games. Recently, Renault proved in [10] that the
uniform value exists in repeated games with an informed controller using an approach based
on an existence result for dynamic programming problems (Renault, [9]). The existence theo-
rem in [10] requires that the first player observes the state variable at each stage and controls
and observes the evolution of the beliefs of the second player on the state variable.
In the present work, we prove that the uniform value exists in the class of repeated games with
a more informed controller. Our existence result requires that the first player is more informed
about the state variable than the second player and also that he controls the evolution of beliefs
of the second player. A weaker version of our result was conjectured in the conclusion of [10],
and it was suggested that the proof may be based on an auxiliary game whose state space
would be the pair of beliefs of both players about the original state variable. We show that
the analysis requires actually to introduce an auxiliary game whose state space is the set of
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second order beliefs of the less informed player and provide a set of weaker assumptions than
those suggested in [10], allowing to deal with imperfect monitoring of actions.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we describe the general model of repeated
games and introduce three assumptions that formalize the notion of a more informed con-
troller. In section 3, we check that several models previously studied in the literature satisfy
these three assumptions. Section 4 is dedicated to a discussion of the assumptions and a
precise study of their implications. In addition, we provide a second version of the theorem
with stronger, but easier to check, assumptions. The last section 5 is dedicated to the proof of
existence of the uniform value. We introduce there an auxiliary stochastic game with perfect
monitoring on an auxiliary state variable which represents the beliefs of player 2 about the
beliefs of player 1 about the state variable of the original game. We prove that this auxiliary
game has a uniform value using the main theorem of Renault [10] and that player 1 can use
optimal strategies in this auxiliary stochastic game in order to play optimally in the original
repeated game. Finally, we prove that player 2 can also guarantee this value by playing by
blocks, so that both games have a uniform value and these values are equal.
2 Model
2.1 General definitions and notation
For any metric space X, let ∆(X) denote the set of Borel probability distributions on X. If
X is a finite set (endowed with the discrete metric) of cardinal |X|, then ∆(X) is precisely
the |X|-dimensional simplex. ∆f (X) ⊂ ∆(X) denotes the probability distributions supported
on a finite subset of X and δx denotes the Dirac measure on x ∈ X.
A zero-sum repeated game is described by a 8-tuple (K, I, J, g, C,D, π, q), where K is the
state space, I and J are the action sets for player 1 and 2 respectively, g is a payoff function
g : K × I × J → [0, 1], and C and D are the signal sets for player 1 and 2 respectively.
π ∈ ∆f (K×N×N) denotes the initial probability and q : K×I×J → ∆(K×C×D) denotes
the transition function.
The game is played as follows: At the beginning of the game, the triple (k1, c1, d1) is
chosen according to the initial probability distribution π ∈ ∆f (K × N × N). For each stage
m ≥ 1, player 1 observes the signal cm and player 2 observes the signal dm. Then both
players choose actions (im, jm) ∈ I × J based on their own past actions and on the sequence
of signals they observed (i.e. we assume perfect recall). Given the state km and the actions
(im, jm), a new triple (km+1, cm+1, dm+1) ∈ K ×C ×D is chosen according to the probability
distribution q(km, im, jm). The payoff for stage m of player 1 is g(km, im, jm) and the game
proceeds to stage m+1. The stage payoffs are not directly observed by the players and cannot
be deduced, in general, from their observations. The sets of initial signals can be any finite
subset of N. This generalization is for technical reasons only. Indeed, it will very convenient
in the sequel to consider this possibly larger set of initial signals in order to have a simple
way to deal with the recursive structure of the game.
The information held by player 1 before his play at stage m, called player 1’s private
history, is given by
hIm , (c1, i1, . . . , cm−1, im−1, cm) ∈ N× (I × C)
m−1.
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Similarly, the information held by player 2 is represented by
hIIm , (d1, j1, . . . , dm−1, jm−1, dm) ∈ N× (J ×D)
m−1.
Let HI (resp. HII) denote the set of all finite private histories for player 1 (resp. of all private
histories for player 2). We assume the sets K, I, J , C and D are all finite and that the
description of the model is common knowledge.
Instead of N, the sets of initial signals will often be denoted by C ′ and D′ where C ′ and
D′ are finite subsets of N. We will also write abusively that π ∈ ∆(K × C ′ × D′). The
initial signals will still be denoted by (c1, d1). Reciprocally, given finite sets C
′ and D′, any
π ∈ ∆(K×C ′×D′) can be seen as an element of ∆f (K ×N×N) using some enumerations of
C ′ and D′. The main advantage is that any couple of finite private histories can be embedded
in N×N via some enumerations. This advantage will become clear in the proof.
Strategies A behavior strategy for player 1 is a map from private histories HI to probabil-
ities over I . The set of behavior strategies of player 1 is denoted by Σ. Every strategy σ ∈ Σ
corresponds to a sequence {σm}m≥1, where σm is defined on the set of histories up to stage
m. That is,
σm : N× (I × C)
m−1 → ∆(I).
Similarly, a behavior strategy τ for player 2 is a map from private histories HII to probability
distributions over J . The set of behavior strategies of player 2 is denoted by T . Any τ
corresponds to a sequence {τm}m≥1, with
τm : N× (J ×D)
m−1 → ∆(J).
The initial distribution π, the transition function q and a behavior strategy profile (σ, τ) ∈
Σ× T induce a unique probability distribution over the set of plays K × N× N× (K × C ×
D × I × J)∞, denoted by Pπστ . Let E
π
στ = EPpiστ denote the expectation with respect to the
probability Pπστ .
Evaluations of the payoff A second component of the model is the way in which the total
payoff of player 1 is evaluated, in terms of the sequence of stage payoffs {g(km, im, jm)}m≥1.
The two classical evaluations correspond to the n-stage game and the λ-discounted game. In
the former, the payoff function is the expected Cesa`ro mean of the stage payoffs of the n first
stages, i.e.
γn(π, σ, τ) = E
π
στ
[ 1
n
∑n
m=1
g(km, im, jm)
]
.
In the latter, the payoff is taken as the expected Abel sum, with respect to the discount factor
0 < λ ≤ 1, i.e.
γλ(π, σ, τ) = E
π
στ
[
λ
∑
m≥1
(1− λ)m−1g(km, im, jm)
]
.
More generally, one may consider any compact evaluation. That is, for any θ ∈ ∆(N∗), let
γθ(π, σ, τ) = E
π
στ
[∑
m≥1
θmg(km, im, jm)
]
. (2.1)
Denote by Γθ(π) the 8-tuple defined above together with the θ-evaluation.
4
The value function For any π ∈ ∆f (K × N × N) and any θ ∈ ∆(N
∗), Γθ(π) is known to
have a value, denoted by vθ(π). It satisfies
vθ(π) = sup
σ∈Σ
inf
τ∈T
γθ(π, σ, τ) = inf
τ∈T
sup
σ∈Σ
γθ(π, σ, τ).
Remark 2.1. These general evaluations will be used in section 5, and we will only need to
consider probabilities with finite support (i.e. θ ∈ ∆f (N
∗)).
Let σ ∈ Σ be a behavior strategy and let h ∈ HI be some finite private history of player 1.
We denote by σ(h) the behavior strategy of player 1 after the history h. Equivalently, σ(h) is
the restriction of the map σ to the subset of histories beginning with h. In particular, given
some strategy profile (σ, τ) ∈ Σ × T and two signals (c, d) ∈ C ′ × D′, consider the profile
(σ(c), τ(d)). It may be interpreted as a strategy profile in a game in which the players have
no initial signals. More formally, for any p ∈ ∆(K), we will use the following notation:
γθ(k, σ(c), τ(d)) , γθ(δ(k,c,d), σ, τ), and γθ(p, σ(c), τ(d)) , γθ(p ⊗ δ(c,d), σ, τ).
With this notation, the payoff can be written as
γθ(π, σ, τ) = Eπ[γθ(k, σ(c), τ(d))] =
∑
(k,c,d)∈K×C′×D′
γθ(k, σ(c), τ(d))π(k, c, d).
Alternatively, one can consider the game as having per se infinitely many stages.
Uniform value The infinitely repeated game is denoted by Γ∞(π). Let us present here
some important definitions relative to the game Γ∞(π). Its value will be called the uniform
value and denoted by v∞(π).
Definition 2.2. Let v be a real number,
• Player 1 can guarantee v in Γ∞(π) if for any ǫ > 0 there exists a strategy σ ∈ Σ of player 1
and an integer N ∈ N, such that
∀n ≥ N, ∀τ ∈ τ , γn(π, σ, τ) ≥ v − ǫ.
We say that such a strategy σ guarantees v − ǫ in Γ∞(π) and define
v∞(π) , sup{v ∈ R | player 1 can garantee v}.
• Player 2 can guarantee v in Γ∞(π) if for any ǫ > 0 there exists a strategy τ ∈ τ of player 2
and an integer N ∈ N, such that
∀n ≥ N, ∀σ ∈ Σ, γn(π, σ, τ) ≤ v + ǫ.
We say that such a strategy τ guarantees v + ǫ in Γ∞(π) and define
v∞(π) , inf{v ∈ R | player 2 can garantee v}.
• If v∞(π) = v∞(π) the uniform value exists and we denote by v∞(π) the common value.
The existence of a uniform value v∞ is stronger than the existence of a limit value (or
asymptotic value), in the sense that it implies (see e.g. Neyman and Sorin [6, Theorem 1] for
more general evaluations)
lim
λ→0
vλ = lim
n→∞
vn = v∞.
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2.2 Model with a more informed controller
We will consider a particular class of the general model presented above, which generalizes
both the class of repeated games considered by Renault [10] and the model of Partially
Observable Markov Decision Processes (see section 3.1). As usual in games with incomplete
information, we call belief of player 1 at stagem about some random variable ξ the conditional
law of ξ given the information held by player 1 at stage m. In the sequel, the first order beliefs
of a player denote beliefs about the state variable k, and second order beliefs of a player denote
beliefs about the first order beliefs of his opponent.
We assume the following three hypotheses at every stage m of the game:
(a1) Player 1’s first order belief is more accurate than player 2’s first order belief.
(a2) Player 1 can compute the second order beliefs of player 2.
(a3) Player 1 controls the evolution of second order beliefs of player 2.
The main result of this paper is to establish the existence of the uniform value under these
assumptions. Let the formal transcription of (a1)− (a3) defined below be denoted by (A1)−
(A3).
Theorem 2.3. Let Γ be a repeated game with a more informed controller, i.e. such that
assumptions (A1), (A2), (A3) hold. Then the uniform value exists.
Remark 2.4. It was already pointed out in the literature (see e.g. Mertens [3]) that in games
with a more informed player, the analysis of beliefs can be restricted to second order beliefs of
the less informed player. In this work, the definition of more informed is slightly more general
than the inclusion of signals and a similar reduction is made formally in Lemma 4.4.
2.3 Formal assumptions
Let us present here a rigorous transcription of the informal assumptions (a1) − (a3). In the
next section, we will present some of the models which satisfy our three assumptions and to
which, consequently, Theorem 2.3 applies.
Let us start with some notations:
Given some probability distribution µ ∈ ∆f (X × Y ) over a product, we denote by
µ(x) ,
∑
y∈Y
µ(x, y).
For any random variable ξ defined on a probability space (Ω,A,P) and F a sub σ-algebra of A,
let LP(ξ | F) denote the conditional distribution of ξ given F , which is seen as a F-measurable
random variable1 and let LP(ξ) denote the distribution of ξ.
In the sequel, both functions g and q are linearly extended to ∆(K)× I × J .
Assumption (a1) can now be formalized as follows:
1All random variables appearing here take only finitely many values so that the definition of conditional
laws does not require any additional care about measurability.
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(A1) ∀n ≥ 1, ∀(σ, τ) ∈ Σ× T , LPpiστ (kn | h
I
n, h
II
n ) = LPpiστ (kn | h
I
n).
In words, at every stage and given any strategy profile, player 2’s information does not contain
any information about the state variable that is not already contained in player 1’s informa-
tion. Assumption (A1) is equivalent to the conditional independence of kn and h
II
n , given h
I
n,
under the probability Pπστ .
For n = 1, this equation does not depend on σ and τ and it can be reformulated as
(A1a) π(c)π(k, c, d) = π(k, c)π(c, d), ∀(k, c, d) ∈ K × C ′ ×D′.
In order to model the players’ information about the state variable at stage n, we need
to define three variables xn, yn and ηn. Before choosing their first action, the players receive
signals (c1, d1) ∈ C
′ ×D′. The (random) variable
x1 , Lπ(k1 | c1) ∈ ∆(K)
represents the first order beliefs of player 1 about the initial state. Let x1(c1) ∈ ∆(K)
denote its realization, i.e. the beliefs of player 1 once he has received the signal c1 ∈ C
′.
Thus, x1(c1) = Lπ(k1|c1) and each signal c1 ∈ C
′ occurs with probability π(c1), so that
Lπ(x1) =
∑
c1∈C′
π(c1)δx1(c1). Similarly, define the second order beliefs of player 2, i.e. beliefs
about player 1’s beliefs about the initial state
y1 , Lπ(x1|d1) ∈ ∆f (∆(K).
With probability π(d1), player 2’s beliefs about player 1’s beliefs (about the state variable)
are distributed as follows:
y1(d1) =
∑
c1∈C′
π(c1|d1)δx1(c1) ∈ ∆f (∆(K)),
with a slight abuse of notations since we write π(c1|d1) instead of π(c1 = c|d1) with a sum
over c ∈ C ′. Finally, let η1 be the distribution of the second order beliefs of player 2
η1 , Lπ(y1) =
∑
d1∈D′
π(d1)δy(d1) ∈ ∆f (∆f (∆(K))).
Notice that the Dirac measures involved in the definition of Lπ(x1) or of Lπ(y1) refer to
different spaces: the former refers to ∆(K), the latter to ∆f (∆(K)).
More generally, for some fixed strategy profile (σ, τ) ∈ Σ × T , let us denote the first order
beliefs of player 1 at stage n by xn ∈ ∆(K), the second order beliefs of player 2 at stage n by
yn ∈ ∆f (∆(K)), and the distribution of yn by ηn.
Definition 2.5. Put xn , LPpiστ (kn | h
I
n), yn , LPpiστ (xn|h
II
n ), and ηn , LPpiστ (yn).
Let us illustrate these definitions through the following example.
Example 2.6. Let K = {k1, k2} be set of states space, U = {u1, u2} a set of public signals and
S = {s1, s2, s3} a set of private signals for player 1. Using the notations above, let C = U ×S
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(resp. D = U) be the set of signals for player 2 (resp. 2). We consider π ∈ ∆(K × S × U)
defined by
u1 u2 u1 u2
s1
s2
s3
 824 01
24
3
24
0 0
 s1s2
s3
 0 01
24
3
24
2
24
6
24

k1 k2
.
It is more convenient here to use K × S × U but π can be understood as a probability on
K × C ×D. To simplify notations, let us identify ∆(K) with [0, 1] with the convention that
p ∈ ∆(K) is identified with p(k1). If player 1 receives signal (s1, u1), then x1 = 1. If he
receives (s2, u1) or (s2, u2), then x1 =
1
2 . Finally, if he receives (s3, u1) or (s3, u2), then
x1 = 0. The value of x1 depends only on his private signal.
We now compute the second order beliefs of player 2. If player 2 receives u1 then his beliefs
about the private signal of player 1 are 824δs1 +
2
24δs2 +
2
24δs3, so that
y1(u1) =
8
24
δ1 +
2
24
δ 1
2
+
2
24
δ0.
If player 2 receives u2, then we obtain
y1(u2) =
6
24
δ 1
2
+
6
24
δ0.
To conclude, player 2 receives each signal with probability 12 , so that η1 is equal to
η1 =
1
2
δ 8
24
δ1+
2
24
δ 1
2
+ 2
24
δ0
+
1
2
δ 6
24
δ 1
2
+ 6
24
δ0
.
Assumption (a2) will be split in two parts (A2a) and (A2b). At first, we assume that
player 1 is able to compute the variable y1, which is a constraint on the initial probability π
only.
(A2a) There exists a map f1 = f
π
1 : C
′ → ∆(∆(K)) such that y1 = f1(c1), π-almost surely.
Assuming (A2a), we can introduce a special class of strategies for player 1 which will be
needed for the second part of the formal assumption.
Definition 2.7. If π ∈ ∆f (K × N × N) fulfills (A2a), a strategy σ ∈ Σ is called a reduced
strategy if it depends on the initial signal c1 in C
′ only through (x1, y1). Let Σ
′(π) ⊂ Σ denote
the subset of reduced strategies.
The second part of (A2) requires that when player 1 is using a reduced strategy, the
variable y2 has to be h
I
2-measurable. Formally:
(A2b) ∀π ∈ ∆f (K ×N×N) satisfying (A2a), ∀σ ∈ Σ
′(π),∀τ ∈ T , ∃f2 = f
π,σ,τ
2 : N× I ×C →
∆(∆(K)) such that y2 = f2(c1, i1, c2), P
π
σ,τ -almost surely.
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The introduction of reduced strategies for player 1 is necessary in order to exclude non
relevant correlations between players (see example 4.1 in section 4). It will be shown in
Lemma 4.4 and in the proof of the main Theorem that there is no loss in restricting player 1
to reduced strategies.
In order to state the last assumption, we reduce the set of initial probabilities.
Definition 2.8. Let ∆∗f (K × N × N) be the set of probability distributions satisfying (A1a)
and (A2a).
Assumption (a3) can now be formalized as
(A3) ∀π ∈ ∆∗f (K × N× N), ∀σ ∈ Σ
′(π), η2 is independent of τ ∈ T .
Remark 2.9. Assumptions (A1, A2) imply that the properties (A1a) and (A2a) of the initial
probability π are preserved by the transition when player 1 plays reduced strategies. Precisely,
for all (σ, τ) with σ reduced, the law of (k2, h
I
2, h
II
2 ) under P
π
στ , seen as an element of ∆f (K×
N×N), belongs to the set ∆∗f (K×N×N). We will prove in section 4 that even if the two last
assumptions (A2b) and (A3) are stated in terms of y2 and η2, it is possible to extend these
properties by induction for yn and ηn for appropriate strategies. Thus the formal assumptions
are coherent with the informal assumptions. In particular, player 1 can compute the auxiliary
variables (x2, y2, η2) without knowing the strategy of player 2 and therefore play again a reduced
strategy at the second stage (i.e. which depends only on (x2, y2)).
3 Applications
We present in this section several models which satisfy our assumptions.
3.1 Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes.
A POMDP is a one-player game, given by a tuple (K, I,C, g, q, π), where K is the state
space, I is the action set, C is the signals set, g : K × I → [0, 1] is the payoff function,
q : K × I → ∆(K ×C) is the transition function and π is an initial distribution on K ×N. In
the finite framework, the existence of the uniform value has been proven by Rosenberg, Solan
and Vieille [11] and it was extended by Renault [9] to arbitrary set of actions and signals
with the additional assumption that all the probabilities appearing in the transition or in the
definition of strategies have finite support. We will only consider here the finite case.
Formally, a POMDP can be seen as a repeated game in which player 2 is dummy (i.e. his
action set J is a singleton). Since player 2 has only one action, his information plays no role
here. The assumptions (A1)− (A3) hold obviously.
3.2 Repeated game with a perfectly informed controller.
The model of a repeated game with an informed controller introduced by Renault [10] fulfils
our assumptions. In this model, player 1 is perfectly informed of the state and of the signal
of player 2, in the sense that he can deduce the true state variable and the signal of player 2
from his signals. Moreover, the transition q is such that player 2 has no influence on the joint
distribution of the pair made by the state variable and his signal.
In [10], the sets of initial signals are C ′ = C and D′ = D. Formally, the first assumption
(i.e. that player 1 is perfectly informed of the state and of the signal of player 2) is given by
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(HA′) There exists two mappings kˆ : C → K and dˆ : C → D such that, if E denotes {(k, c, d) ∈
K × C ×D, kˆ(c) = k, dˆ(c) = d}, then
π(E) = 1, and q(k, i, j)(E) = 1, ∀(k, i, j) ∈ K × I × J.
The second assumption is formalized by
(HB′) Player 1 controls the transition in the sense that the marginal of the transition q on
K × D does not depend on player 2’s action. For k ∈ K, i ∈ I, j ∈ J , we denote by
q(k, i) the marginal of q(k, i, j) on K ×D.
Let us check that this model satisfies our assumptions. Assuming that the initial distribution
π ∈ ∆(K × C ×D) fulfils assumption (HA′), we have
y1(d1) =
∑
c1∈C
π(c1|d1)δLpi(k1|c1,d1) =
∑
c1∈C
π(c1|d1)δδ
kˆ(c1)
=
∑
k1∈K
π(k1|d1)δδk1 .
We deduce that π can be seen as an element of ∆∗f (K × N× N). Formally, we have to verify
our assumptions, starting from any initial distribution in ∆∗f (K×N×N). From now on, initial
signals (c1, d1) belong to arbitrary finite subsets of N denoted by C
′,D′ as in the previous
section2.
First, note that any stage m ≥ 2, player 1’s first order belief at each stage is a Dirac mass
on the current state (i.e. xn = δkn). Thus, adding the signal of player 2 to the signal of
player 1 does not change the beliefs of the latter, which proves (A1). It also implies that the
second order beliefs of player 2 can be identified with the first order beliefs of player 2. Let
π ∈ ∆∗f (K×N×N), τ be a strategy for player 2 and σ a reduced strategy for player 1. Recall
that σ is function only of (x1, y1) which are by assumption c1 measurable and that that y1
is d1-measurable, so that there exist two functions h1 and f1 such that, with probability 1,
Lπ(x1|d1) = y1 = h1(d1) = f1(c1). It follows that
P
π
στ (k1, x1, d1, i1, j1, k2, d2) = π(d1)h1(d1)(x1)x1(k1)σ(x1, h1(d1))(i1)τ(d1)(j1)q(k1, i1)(k2, d2).
We deduce that
y2(d1, j1, d2) =
∑
c1,i1,c2
P
π
στ (c1, i1, c2|d1, j1, d2)δLPpiστ (k2|c1,i1,c2)
=
∑
c1,i1,c2
P
π
στ (c1, i1, c2|d1, j1, d2)δδkˆ(c2)
=
∑
k2
P
π
στ (k2|d1, j1, d2)δδk2
=
∑
k1,x1,k2,i1
π(d1)h1(d1)(x1)σ(x1, h1(d1))(i1)q(k1, i1)(k2, d2)δδk2∑
k′1,x
′
1,k
′
2,i
′
1
π(d1)y1(d1)(x′1)σ(x
′
1, y1(d1))(i
′
1)q(k
′
1, i
′
1)(k
′
2, d2)
=
∑
k1,x1,k2,i1
f1(c1)(x1)σ(x1, f1(c1))(i1)q(k1, i1)(k2, d2)δδk2∑
k′1,x
′
1,k
′
2,i
′
1
f1(c1)(x
′
1)σ(x
′
1, f1(c1))(i
′
1)q(k
′
1, i
′
1)(k
′
2, d2)
2One may easily reduce the analysis to a smaller set of initial probabilities, but we chose to keep this general
formulation since the reduction does not really simplify the proofs.
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where the above equalities hold almost surely whenever the conditional probabilities are well-
defined. We deduce that y2 is only a function of c1 and d2 which does not depend on τ , so
that the function f2(c1, c2) = y2(c1, dˆ(c2)) proves that assumption (A2) is satisfied. Finally
the distribution of the random variable y2 is equal to
η2 =
∑
c1,d2
P
π
στ (c1, d2)δy2(c1,d2).
Using the preceding result and that the marginal of q on D does not depend on the action
played by player 2, η2 does not depend on τ and (A3) is satisfied.
Remark 3.1. In a previous work, Renault [8] studied the particular case where the state
follows a Markov chain f : K → ∆(K), player 1 observes the state and both players observe
the actions. This is easily seen as a particular case of the above model. In a more recent
work, Neyman [7] proved the existence of the uniform value when allowing for any signalling
structure on the actions. This last result is not covered by our main theorem since in this
case, player 1 cannot control player 2’s information about the state variable.
3.3 Player 1 is more informed about the state.
In this last paragraph, we assume that actions are observed by both players after each stage.
Moreover, both players receive a public signal in a set U , player 1 receives a signal in a set S
and player 2 has influence on the joint distribution of the state and signals in K × U × S.
Formally, it is a repeated game where C = I×J×S×U , D = I×J×U and the transition
function satisfies the following two conditions. At first, the signal u is public and the actions
are observed:
∀(k, i, j) ∈ K × I × J,
∑
k′,s,u∈K×S×U
q(k, i, j)(k′, (i, j, u), (i, j, s, u)) = 1.
Secondly, there exists a function qˆ from K × I to ∆(K × S × U) such that
∀(k, k′, i, j, s, u) ∈ K ×K × I × J × S × U, q(k, i, j)(k′, (i, j, s, u), (i, j, u)) = qˆ(k, i)(k′, s, u).
Let us stress out that the transition q in itself depends on player 2 since it has to reveal his
actions but as we will see our assumptions are still satisfied. It was already noticed in Renault
[10] that it is too restrictive to assume that the transition is fully controlled by player 1. This
model is a natural generalization of Renault’s model, dropping the (important) condition of
Player 1 to know the state at every stage. However, it does not allow for imperfect monitoring
of actions as in the previous examples.
Let us check that this model satisfies our assumptions. According to the description of the
model, an initial distribution π of (k1, s1, u1) can be seen as an element of ∆
∗
f (K×N×N) since
the signal of player 2 is contained in the signal of player 1. As for the previous example, we
will start with a general initial probability π ∈ ∆∗f (K ×N×N) and initial signals (c1, d1). At
first, note that apart from the initial signal d1, histories of player 2 are contained in histories
of player 1, so that assumption (A1) reduces to
∀n ≥ 1, ∀(σ, τ) ∈ Σ× T , LPpiστ (kn | h
I
n, d1) = LPpiστ (kn | h
I
n).
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This property is true for n = 1 by assumption. Let us proceed by induction on n. Assume
that n ≥ 2 and that the property is proved for n− 1, i.e. that
xn−1 = LPpiστ (kn−1 | h
I
n−1, d1) = LPpiστ (kn−1 | h
I
n−1).
Again, let qˆ be linearly extended to ∆(K)× I. It follows that,
LPpiστ (kn, sn, un|h
I
n−1, d1, in−1, jn−1) = qˆ(xn−1, in−1) = LPpiστ (kn, sn, un|h
I
n−1, in−1, jn−1),
(A1) follows then directly by disintegration. Moreover, we deduce that
P
π
σ,τ (kn = k|h
I
n) =
qˆ(xn−1, i1)(k, sn, un)∑
k′∈K qˆ(xn−1, i1)(k
′, sn, un)
. (3.1)
The latter proves that x2 can be expressed as a function of (x1, i1, s2, u2) which does not
depend on τ . Recall then that by assumption there exist functions h1 and f1 such that with
probability 1, we have
y1 = Lπ(x1|d1) = h1(d1) = f1(c1).
If player 1 uses a reduced strategy σ and player 2 uses a strategy τ , we have
P
π
σ,τ (k1, x1, d1, i1, j1, k2, s2, u2) = π(d1)h1(d1)(x1)x1(k1)σ(x1, h1(d1))(i1)τ(d1)(j1)qˆ(k1, i1)(k2, s2, u2).
We deduce that
y2(d1, i1, j1, u2) =
∑
x1,i1,s2
P
π
σ,τ (x1, i1, s2|d1, j1, u2)δLPpiσ,τ (k2|x1,d1,i1,j1,s2,u2)
=
∑
x1,i1,s2
P
π
σ,τ (x1, i1, s2|d1, j1, u2)δx2(x1,i1,s2,u2).
From the previous formula, we deduce
P
π
σ,τ (x1, i1, s2|d1, j1, u2) =
∑
k1
π(d1)h1(d1)(x1)x1(k1)σ(x1, h1(d1))(i1)τ(d1)(j1)qˆ(k1, i1)(s2, u2)∑
k′1,x
′
1,i
′
1,s
′
2
π(d1)h1(d1)(x′1)x
′
1(k
′
1)σ(x
′
1, h1(d1))(i
′
1)τ(d1)(j1)qˆ(k
′
1, i
′
1)(s
′
2, u2)
=
∑
k1
f1(c1)(x1)x1(k1)σ(x1, f1(c1))(i1)qˆ(k1, i1)(s2, u2)∑
k′1,x
′
1,i
′
1,s
′
2
f1(c1)(x
′
1)x
′
1(k
′
1)σ(x
′
1, f1(c1))(i
′
1)qˆ(k
′
1, i
′
1)(s
′
2, u2)
.
Thus, y2 does not depend on τ nor on (j1, d1). Player 1, knowing i1, c1 and u2, can compute
y2, which proves that assumption (A2) is satisfied. Finally, the distribution of the random
variable y2 is equal to
η2 =
∑
c1,i1,u2
P
π
σ,τ (c1, i1, u2)δy2(c1,i1,u2).
Since the function qˆ does not depend on j1, we deduce as above that η2 does not depend on
τ and therefore that (A3) is satisfied.
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4 Discussion of the assumptions
In this section, we discuss several implications of the formal assumptions (A1) ,(A2), (A3).
At first, we show that it is necessary to introduce the notion of reduced strategy in order
to exclude non relevant correlations between the players. Then, in order to answer to a
suggestion made in [10], we show that the analysis cannot be made in terms of first order
beliefs only, and that it is necessary to introduce second order beliefs. Lemma 4.4 shows that
the value can be expressed as a function of second order beliefs. Then, we prove that player
1 can compute his first order beliefs, the second order beliefs of player 2 and the distribution
of these beliefs without knowing the strategy of player 2 as soon as he plays a Markovian
strategy with respect to the beliefs at each stage. Finally, we give a weaker version of the
theorem where the assumptions are formulated more directly in terms of the data of the game.
4.1 Necessity of reduced strategies.
The introduction of reduced strategies for player 1 is necessary in order to exclude non relevant
correlations between players as shown in example 4.1 below. It will be shown in Lemma 4.4
and in the main Theorem that in our model, there is no loss in restricting player 1 to reduced
strategies.
Example 4.1. Let K = {k1, k2}, I = {T,B}, C = {a, b}, D = {α, β} and J any finite set.
The transition q depends only on the action of player 1 and is described by the matrices
T
B
(
δk1
1
2δk1 +
1
2δk2
) (
1
2δk1 +
1
2δk2
δk2
)
.
k1 k2
.
At each stage (including at the initial stage), the signals of the players are randomly chosen
independently of the state variable with distribution
α β
a
b
(
1/6 2/6
2/6 1/6
)
.
It is clear that signals do not contain any information on the state variable. However, assume
that the initial state is k1 and that player 1 plays at the first stage action T if he receives the
signal a and action B if he receives the signal b. The second order beliefs y2 of player 2 will
differ if his initial private signal is equal to α or β. Since player 1 is not able to compute
the initial signal of player 2, he is not able to compute the variable y2 at the second stage.
Nevertheless, when considering reduced strategies, signals can be omitted and player 1 is able
to compute the beliefs of player 2 which implies that (A2) is satisfied.
4.2 Second-order beliefs
Renault [10] conjectured that the pair of distributions of first order beliefs of both players
could be sufficient auxiliary variables. We present here an example showing the necessity to
take into account second order beliefs in the sense that there exist a game and two initial
probabilities π and π′ such that the law of first-order beliefs are the same under π and π′
while the values differ.
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Example 4.2. We consider again the situation of example 2.6. Recall that K = {k1, k2}, that
there are two public signals U = {u1, u2} available to both players and three private signals
S = {s1, s2, s3} for player 1. The set of signals of player 1 is C = U ×S and the set of signals
of player 2 is D = U . Let π, π′ ∈ ∆(K × S × U) be defined by
u1 u2 u1 u2
s1
s2
s3
 824 01
24
3
24
0 0
 s1s2
s3
 0 01
24
3
24
2
24
6
24

k1 k2
.
and
u1 u2 u1 u2
s1
s2
s3
 624 2243
24
1
24
0 0
 s1s2
s3
 0 03
24
1
24
0 824

k1 k2
.
We will identify ∆(K) and [0, 1] as in example 2.6. The beliefs of Player 2 about the state
are the same in both cases and are equal to 12δ 34
+ 12δ 14
. Similarly the beliefs of Player 1
are 13δ1 +
1
3δ 12
+ 13δ0 in both games. Moreover player 1 observes the signal of player 2, so
that assumption (A2) is satisfied. Thus, the laws of first-order beliefs are not sufficient to
discriminate between π and π′. Let Γ be the repeated game where K = {k1, k2}, I = {T,B},
J = {L,R} and payoff g given by (
0 1
1 2
) (
1 12
1 0
)
k1 k2
.
The average payoff matrix with coefficients (12 ,
1
2) is
(
1
2
3
4
1 1
)
.
Let us prove that v1(π) and v1(π
′) are different. If player 1 receives s3, then his beliefs on
the state is 0 and thus Top is a weakly dominant action. If he receives s1 or s2, his beliefs is
1 or 12 and Bottom is a strictly dominant action. From the point of view of player 2, playing
Left if receiving u1 and playing Right if receiving u2 is a best reply to this strategy. Using
these strategies, we find that v1(π) =
7
8 and v1(π
′) = 1112 .
Let us prove that if assumptions (A1a) and (A2a) hold, then vθ(π) depends only on the
law of second order beliefs of player 2.
Definition 4.3. For all π ∈ ∆∗f (K × N× N), define
Φ(π) , Lπ (Lπ (Lπ(k1|c1)|d1)) .
Lemma 4.4. Let π, π′ ∈ ∆∗f (K × N×N). If Φ(π) = Φ(π
′), then vθ(π) = vθ(π
′).
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Proof. Let (σ, τ) be a pair of behavior strategies in Γθ(π). It is enough to show that vθ(π) de-
pends on π only through η1 = Φ(π). Recall that x1 := Lπ(k1|c1) and y1 := Lπ (Lπ(k1|c1)|d1).
Note that y1 is a function of d1, and that x1 is a function of c1. Moreover, by assumption
(A2a), there exists a map fπ1 : C
′ → ∆(∆(K)) such that
fπ1 (c1) = y1 π-almost surely.
Let us construct a reduced version of the game Γθ(π) in which player 1 and player 2 are
constrained to choose strategies that depend only on c1 and d1 through the variables (x1, y1)
and y1 respectively, and keeping the same payoff function. This game has a value since the
sets of possible values of (x1, y1) is finite and this value is exactly the value of Γθ(π˜) where π˜
is the joint distribution of (k1, (x1, y1), y1) seen as an element of ∆
∗
f (K × N× N).
The sets of strategies in Γθ(π˜) (denoted by Σ
′(π) and T ′(π)) can be seen as subsets of Σ
and T via the previous identification and we will prove that both games have the same value
and that vθ(π˜) depends only on η1.
Assume at first that τ ∈ T ′(π) and σ ∈ Σ and let µ denote the joint law of (k1, c1, d1, x1, y1)
induced by π. By disintegration, we have
γθ(π, σ, τ) =
∫
K×N×∆(K)×∆(∆(K))
γθ(k1, σ(c1), τ(y1))dµ(k1, c1, x1, y1),
=
∫
N×∆(K)×∆(∆(K))
(∫
K
γθ(k1, σ(c1), τ(y1))dLµ(k1|c1, x1, y1)
)
dµ(c1, x1, y1),
=
∫
N×∆(K)×∆(∆(K))
∫
K
γθ(k1, σ(c1), τ(y1))dLµ(k1|c1)dµ(c1, x1, y1),
=
∫
N×∆(K)×∆(∆(K))
〈γθ(·, σ(c1), τ(y1)), x1〉RKdµ(c1, x1, y1),
where we used that Lµ(k1|c1, x1, y1) = Lµ(k1|c1) since (x1, y1) are c1-measurable and the no-
tations γθ(., σ(c1), τ(y1)) for (γθ(k, σ(c1), τ(y1)))k∈K ∈ R
K and 〈·, ·〉RK for the scalar product
in RK . Taking the supremum over all strategies of player 1, we obtain
sup
σ∈Σ
γθ(π, σ, τ) =
∫
N×∆(K)×∆(∆(K))
sup
σ(c1)
〈γθ(·, σ(c1), τ(y1)), x1〉RKdµ(c1, x1, y1).
The supremum inside the integral is achieved by strategies depending only on (x1, y1) since
these variables are c1 measurable. It means that there exists an optimal strategy in Σ
′(π),
which proves
inf
τ∈T ′(π)
sup
σ∈Σ
γθ(π, σ, τ) = inf
τ∈T ′(π)
sup
σ∈Σ′(π)
γθ(π, σ, τ).
Moreover the value of the reduced game depends only on η1 since taking the infimum over
τ ∈ T ′(π),
inf
τ∈T ′(π)
sup
σ∈Σ′(π)
γ(π, σ, τ) (4.1)
=
∫
∆(∆(K))
[
inf
τ(y1)
∫
∆(K)
(
sup
σ(x1,y1)
〈γθ(·, σ(x1, y1), τ(y1)), x1〉RK
)
dLµ(x1 | y1)
]
dµ(y1),
(4.2)
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which depends only on the law of y1, since y1 = Lµ(x1 | d1) = Lµ(x1 | y1).
Let us prove a dual equality starting with σ ∈ Σ′(π) and τ ∈ T :
γθ(π, σ, τ) =
∫
K×N×N×∆(K)×∆(∆(K))
γθ(k1, σ(x1, y1), τ(d1))dµ(k1, c1, d1, x1, y1),
=
∫
N×N×∆(K)×∆(∆(K))
(∫
K
γθ(k1, σ(x1, y1), τ(d1))dLµ(k1|c1, d1, x1, y1)
)
dµ(c1, d1, x1, y1)
=
∫
N×N×∆(K)×∆(∆(K))
〈γθ(·, σ(x1, y1), τ(d1)), x1〉RKdµ(c1, d1, x1, y1)
=
∫
N×∆(K)×∆(∆(K))
〈γθ(·, σ(x1, y1), τ(d1)), x1〉RKdµ(d1, x1, y1)
=
∫
N×∆(∆(K))
(∫
∆(K)
〈γθ(·, σ(x1, y1), τ(d1)), x1〉RKdLµ(x1 | d1, y1)
)
dµ(d1, y1).
For the second equality, we used that Lµ(k1 | c1, d1, x1, y1) = Lµ(k1 | c1, d1) = Lµ(k1 | c1) = x1
which follows from the fact that (x1, y1) is c1-measurable and assumption (A1). Taking the
infimum over all τ ∈ T , it follows that
inf
τ∈τ
γ(π, σ, τ) =
∫
N×∆(∆(K))
inf
τ(d1)
(∫
∆(K)
〈γθ(·σ(x1, y1), τ(d1)), x1〉RKdLµ(x1 | d1)
)
dµ(d1, y1).
(4.3)
The infimum inside the integral is achieved for strategies depending only on y1 = Lµ(x1 | d1)
since y1 is d1-measurable. We proved that
sup
σ∈Σ′(π)
inf
τ∈T
γθ(π, σ, τ) = sup
σ∈Σ′(π)
inf
τ∈T ′(π)
γθ(π, σ, τ).
Finally, using that T ′(π) ⊂ T and Σ′(π) ⊂ Σ, it follows that
vθ(π) = sup
σ∈Σ
inf
τ∈T
γθ(π, σ, τ) ≥ sup
σ∈Σ′(π)
inf
τ∈T
γθ(π, σ, τ) = vθ(π˜),
vθ(π) = inf
τ∈T
sup
σ∈Σ
γθ(π, σ, τ) ≤ inf
τ∈T ′(π)
sup
σ∈Σ
γθ(π, σ, τ) = vθ(π˜),
which proves the equality. Since vθ(π˜) depends only on η1, the proof is complete.
4.3 Player 1 can compute his beliefs without knowing player 2’s strategy.
Assumption (A1) can be reformulated as a couple of assumptions (A1a) and (A1b) which are
expressed in terms of π, i.e. the initial information, and q, i.e. the evolution of the information
structure for stages m ≥ 2 respectively.
(A1a) The probability π ∈ ∆(K × C ′ ×D′) is such that
∀(k, c′, d′) ∈ K × C ′ ×D′, π(c′)π(k, c′, d′) = π(k, c′)π(c′, d′)
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(A1b) There exists a map F from ∆(K)× I × C to ∆(K) such that
∀(p, i, j, c, d, k) ∈ ∆(K)×I×J×C×D×K, q(p, i, j)[k, c, d] = F (p, i, c)[k]
∑
k′∈K
q(p, i, j)[k′, c, d].
Note that (A1a) is equivalent to π(k|c′, d′) = π(k|c′) for any (k, c′, d′) such that π(c′, d′) >
0. Similarly (A1b) could be written in terms of conditional probabilities, though we shall
distinguish events with probability 0. In addition, it highlights the first important consequence
of assumption (A1): player 1 can compute his beliefs about the state variable (i.e. the
conditional distribution in the right-hand-side of (A1)) without knowing the strategy, nor the
signals, of his opponent.
Proposition 4.5. Assuming (A1), player 1 can compute xn for each n ≥ 1 without knowing
the strategy of player 2.
The proof of the Proposition follows directly from the following Lemma.
Lemma 4.6. Assumptions (A1) and (A1a + A1b) are equivalent. Furthermore, the map F
from ∆(K)× I × C to ∆(K) defined in (A1b) is such that for all n ≥ 2 and for all strategy
profile (σ, τ)
xn = F (xn−1, in−1, cn−1), P
π
στ -almost surely.
Proof. Using the definition of conditional independence, assumption (A1) at stage 1 is equiv-
alent to (A1a). It remains to prove that (A1) for n ≥ 2 implies (A1b) and the converse.
Assume that π fulfils (A1a) and let (σ1, τ1) ∈ ∆(I)
C′×∆(J)D
′
be strategies with full support.
By construction, we have
LPpiστ (k2, c2, d2 | k1, c1, i1, d1, j1) = q(k1, i1, j1) ∈ ∆(K × C ×D).
It follows, using the tower property of conditional expectation and (A1a) that
LPpiστ (k2, c2, d2 | c1, i1, d1, j1) = q(x1, i1, j1),
where, by definition, x1 can be written as a function of c1. On one hand, one obtains by
disintegration
P
π
στ (k2 = k | c2, d2, c1, i1, d1, j1)(
∑
k˜∈K
q(x1, i1, j1)[k˜, c2, d2]) = q(x1, i1, j1)[k, c2, d2].
On the other hand, the conditional law LPpiστ (k2 | c1, i1, c2) is characterized by the following
expression
P
π
στ (k2 = k | c1, i1, c2)(
∑
k˜,d˜1,d˜2,j˜1
π(c1, d˜1)τ1(d˜1)[˜j1]q(x1(c1), i1, j˜1)[k˜, c2, d˜2])
=
∑
d˜1,d˜2,j˜1
π(c1, d˜1)τ1(d˜1)[˜j1]q(x1(c1), i1, j˜1)[k, c2, d˜2].
Assumption (A1) for n = 2 implies that these two conditional probabilities are equal, which
in turn implies
q(x1, i1, j1)[k, c2, d2]∑
k˜∈K
q(x1, i1, j1)[k˜, c2, d2]
=
∑
d˜1,d˜2,j˜1
π(c1, d˜1)τ1(d˜1)[˜j1]q(x1(c1), i1, j˜1)[k, c2, d˜2]∑
k˜,d˜1,d˜2,j˜1
π(c1, d˜1)τ1(d˜1)[˜j1]q(x1(c1), i1, j˜1)[k˜, c2, d˜2]
(4.4)
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whenever the left-hand side is well-defined. Since τ1 has full support, this implies that the
right-hand side is also well-defined in this case and does not depend on d1, j1, d2. Moreover,
for all p ∈ ∆(K), we can choose an initial distribution π such that π(x1 = p) > 0. It follows
that there exists a function F such that
F (p, i, c)[k] =
q(p, i, j)[k, c, d]∑
k′∈K q(p, i, j)[k
′, c, d]
,
whenever the right hand side is well-defined for some (j, d) and extended by 1/|K| (say)
otherwise.
For the converse assertion, we already mentioned that (A1a) implies (A1) for n = 1. We
are therefore allowed to write the following formula for the conditional laws,
P(k2 = k | c2, d2, c1, i1, d1, j1) =
q(x1, i1, j1)[k, c2, d2]∑
k˜∈K
q(x1, i1, j1)[k˜, c2, d2]
. (4.5)
It follows therefore that
P(k2 = k | c2, d2, c1, i1, d1, j1) = F (x1, i1, c2), P
π
στ -almost surely,
and since the right-hand-side is measurable with respect to the history of player 1, we have
the equality
P(k2 = k | c2, c1, i1) = E
[
P(k2 = k | c2, d2, c1, i1, d1, j1)|c1, i1, c2
]
,
= F (x1, i1, c2),
= P(k2 = k | c2, d2, c1, i1, d1, j1).
which proves (A1) and our last assertion for n = 2. Finally the distribution of (k2, (c1, i1, c2), (d1, j1, d2)),
seen as an element of ∆f (K × N × N), fulfils (A1a). Applying exactly the same argument
with these new initial signals allows us therefore to conclude by induction on n.
4.4 Player 1 can compute the beliefs of player 2.
The assumptions (A1) and (A2) are independent, as shown in example 4.7 below. However,
(A2) really makes sense only when player 1 is better informed.
Example 4.7. Let Γ = (K, I, J,C,D, q, g) be such that player 1 is in the dark and player 2
is perfectly informed: K = {α, β}, I and J are finite, C is a singleton {c} and D = K. The
payoff mapping is anything and the state is randomly chosen at each stage with probability
(1/2, 1/2). Player 1 observes nothing and player 2 learns the state. It is clear that player 1’s
signal is less accurate than player 2’s, so that assumption (A1) is not satisfied. On the other
hand, (A2) is satisfied since player 1 knows the beliefs of player 2 about himself which is (12 ,
1
2)
whatever are the signals.
Under the assumptions (A1) and (A2), if player 1 plays a reduced strategy, he can compute
y2, the belief of player 2 about his own belief on the state, without knowing the strategy of
player 2.
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Lemma 4.8. Assume (A1b) and (A2b), and let π ∈ ∆∗f (K×N×N). Then, for all σ ∈ Σ
′(π),
there exists a map f2 = f
π,σ
2 such that for all τ ∈ τ
y2 = f2(h
I
2), P
π
στ − almost surely.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove that the map f2 appearing in (A2b) does not depend on τ . Note
that since we assumed (A1), we have x2 = F (x1(c1), i1, c2) almost surely, where F is defined
in (A1b). Moreover, the conditional probability
P
π
στ (c1 = c˜1, i1 = i˜1,c2 = c˜2|d1, j1, d2)
=
π(c˜1, d1)σ(x1(c˜1), y1(d1))(˜i1)τ(d1)(j1)q(x1(c˜1, i˜1, j1)(c˜2, d2)∑
c′1,i
′
1,c
′
2
π(x′, d1)σ(x1(c
′
1), y1(d1))(i
′
1)τ(d1)(j1)q(x1(c
′
1), i
′
1, j1)(c
′
2, d2)
=
π(c˜1, d1)σ(x1(c˜1), y1(d1))(˜i1)q(x1(c˜1, i˜1, j1)(c˜2, d2)∑
c′1,i
′
1,c
′
2
π(x′, d1)σ(x1(c′1), y1(d1))(i
′
1)q(x1(c
′
1), i
′
1, j1)(c
′
2, d2)
does not depend on τ . There exists therefore a map y2(d1, j1, d2) which does not depend on
τ , defined by the above expression everywhere it makes sense and arbitrarily elsewhere. Let
τ∗ be a strategy with full support. Using (A2b), there exists a map fπ,σ,τ
∗
2 such that
y2(d1, j1, d2) = f
π,σ,τ∗
2 (c1, i1, c2), P
π
στ∗ − almost surely.
The previous computation shows that the conditional law of (c1, i1, c2) given (d1, j1, d2) does
not depend on τ . Therefore, if the event
{d1 = d˜1, j1 = j˜1, d2 = d˜2, c1 = c˜1, i1 = i˜1, c2 = c˜2}
has positive probability under Pπστ , it also has positive probability under P
π
στ∗ . We deduce
that fπ,σ,τ2 = f
π,σ,τ∗
2 , P
π
στ -almost surely for all τ , which concludes the proof.
Let us now prove that player 1 is able to play a strategy which is Markovian with respect
to the beliefs. The idea is to prove by induction that if player 1 plays a strategy which depends
at stage n − 1 only on (xn−1, yn−1), then he can compute the variables (xn, yn) at stage n
and play at stage n a strategy which depends only on (xn, yn), etc... Formally, we have the
following.
Lemma 4.9. For all π ∈ ∆∗f (K × N × N), and for any sequence of ∆(I)-valued measurable
functions ψ1, ψ2, ... defined on ∆(K)×∆f (∆(K), there exists a strategy σ such that for all τ
and for all n
σ(hIn) = ψn(xn, yn), P
π
στ − almost surely.
Proof. We will prove the result by induction. It is obviously true for n = 1 due to the
definition of ∆∗f (K×N×N). For n = 2, due to the Lemmas 4.6 and 4.8, player 1 can compute
x2 and y2 as a function of h
I
2 independently of the chosen strategy of player 2. However, to
prove the property for n ≥ 3, we cannot rely on the same argument. It would be tempting to
say that the distribution of (k2, h
I
2, h
II
2 ) belongs to ∆
∗
f (K×N×N) and to apply the preceding
argument when starting from this new initial distribution. But this would be wrong since
this distribution may depend on τ . To overcome this problem, it is sufficient to prove that
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the map f2 appearing in (A2b) and the distribution η2 appearing in (A3) depend on π only
through Φ(π). Indeed, in this case, reasoning by induction, player 1 can compute ηn as a
function of ηn−1 and his new signals, xn using Lemma 4.6, and yn using the map given by
(A2b) which will depend only on ηn−1 and his own strategy.
Let us prove this assertion. Let π ∈ ∆∗f (K ×N×N), and σ ∈ Σ
′(π) be a reduced strategy,
which implies that there exists a map ψ : K × ∆(K) → ∆(I) such that π-almost surely
σ1(c1) = ψ(x1, y1). Assumption (A3) implies that η2 is a function of the initial distribution
π and σ1 only. We denote it by η2(π, σ). We now prove that η2(π, σ) and the map f
π,σ
2
appearing in (A2b) depend only on the projection of π, η1 = Φ(π), and on the map ψ.
At first, given η1 ∈ ∆f (∆f (∆(K))), we can construct a canonical probability π with finite
support on K × ∆(K) × ∆f (∆(K)) defined by π(k, p, z) = p
kz(p)η(z). Applying (A3) and
(A2) in the game Γ(π) if player 1 plays σ1 = ψ, there exists a distribution η2(π, ψ) and a map
fπ,ψ2 : K ×∆(K) such that y2 = f
π,ψ
2 (x1, y1) almost surely and y2 has law η2(π, ψ) for all τ .
Recall that π is such that Φ(π) = η1 and that σ1 is such that σ1(c1) = ψ(x1, y1). Note also
that d1 and x1 are conditionally independent given y1 under π. Therefore, for any τ1, the joint
law of (x1, y1, i1, j1, c2, d2) is the same under P
π
σ1,τ1
and under the probability Pπ
ψ,τ ′1
where τ ′1
is defined as follows: choose d1 using some exogenous lottery such that the conditional law of
d1 given y1 is the same as under π and then play τ1(d1). We deduce that η2(π, σ1) = η2(π, ψ)
and y2 = f
π,ψ
2 (x1, y1) under the probability P
π
σ1,τ1
which concludes the proof.
4.5 A stronger version of the theorem
To conclude this section, let us state a couple of stronger assumptions, which are expressed in
terms of the data of the game more directly: Player 1 can deduce exactly the signal received
by player 2 and player 2 can not influence the joint law of (x2, d2).
Definition 4.10. For all, x, i, j ∈ ∆(K)× I × J , let qC×D(x, i, j) denote the marginal distri-
bution on C ×D induced by q(x, i, j), i.e. qC×D(x, i, j)(c, d) =
∑
k,k˜ x(k)q(k, i, j)(k˜, c, d).
Let also Hx,i the map defined on C ×D by
Hx,i(c, d) = (F (x, i, c), d) ∈ ∆(K)×D.
With these notations, we can define a set of assumptions on the marginal of q. The
assumptions (A1), (A2a) are unchanged and we define (A′2b) and (A′3).
(A′2b) Player 1 knows the signal of player 2 i.e. there exists a map h : C → D such that for
all (k, i, j) ∈ K × I × J ,
∑
c∈C q(k, i, j)[c, h(c)] = 1.
(A′3) The image probability φ(x, i) of qC×D(x, i, j) by the map Hx,i does not depend on j.
Corollary 4.11. Let Γ be such that assumptions (A1), (A2a), (A′2b) and (A′3) are true.
Then:
For all π ∈ ∆∗f (K × N× N), Γ(π) has a uniform value.
The proof of this corollary follows directly from the next Lemma.
Lemma 4.12. If A1 and A2a hold, then A′2b and A′3 imply A2b and A3.
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Proof. It follows from the definitions and from Lemma 4.6 that
LPpiστ (x2, d2 | c1, d1, i1, j1) = LPpiστ (F (x1, i1, c2), d2 | c1, d1, i1, j1)
= LPpiστ (Hx1,i1(c2, d2) | c1, d1, i1, j1) = φ(x1, i1),
since (x1, i1) is measurable with respect to (c1, d1, i1, j1) and φ(x1, i1) is the image probability
of qC×D(x1, i1, j1) by the map Hx1,i1 . Therefore, the conditional law of the pair (x2, d2) does
not depend on the strategy of player 2. Precisely, we have
LPpiστ (x2, d2 | d1, j1) = E
π
στ [φ(x1, i1) | d1, j1].
Since j1 and (x1, i1) are conditionally independent given d1 it follows that
LPpiστ (x2, d2 | d1, j1) = E
π
στ [φ(x1, i1) | d1].
The right hand side does not depend on τ , so LPpiστ (x2, d2 | d1, j1) does not depend on τ and
j1, and the same is true for the (unconditional) law of (x2, y2). As a consequence, the law
of y2 (denoted η2) does not depend on τ which proves (A3). It remains to prove that player
1 can compute the auxiliary random variable y2. Using (A2a) and that σ is reduced, i1 can
be written as a measurable function of (x1, y1) and of an independent random variable u
uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Recall that the conditional law of x1 given d1 is y1, so that
LPpiστ (x2, d2 | d1, j1) = E
π
στ [φ(x1, i1(x1, y1, u)) | d1]
=
∫
∆(K)×[0,1]
φ(x, i1(x, y1, u)dy1[x]du.
Player 1 can compute the conditional law of (x2, d2) given (d1, j1) since it depends only on
(y1, σ). Moreover by assumption (A
′2b), he can deduce d1 from his initial signal c1, so he is
able to compute y2 which proves (A2b).
5 Proof of Theorem 2.3.
The proof is divided into three steps. First, using Lemma 4.4, we define a value function
vˆ on ∆f (∆f (∆(K))) and prove that it is concave and Lipschitz. Secondly, we introduce an
auxiliary game G on ∆f (∆(K)) and check it satisfies some (slightly) weakened assumptions
needed to apply a Theorem of Renault [10]. This implies the existence of a uniform value in
the auxiliary game. Finally we show that both players can guarantee this value in the original
game: player 2 by playing by blocks and player 1 by using optimal Markovian strategies in
the auxiliary game.
5.1 The canonical value function vˆθ
In view of Lemma 4.4, it is appropriate to work directly on the set ∆f (∆f (∆(K))), i.e.
for any π, π′ such that Φ(π) = Φ(π′) the value of the game is the same. At first, given
η ∈ ∆f (∆f (∆(K))), there is a canonical way to build a distribution π such that φ(π) = η.
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Definition 5.1. Let Γ = (K, I, J,C,D) be a repeated game. For any η ∈ ∆f (∆f (∆(K))),
we define D′ = supp(η) ⊂ ∆f (∆(K)) and C
′ = D′ ×
(
∪z∈supp(η)supp(z)
)
. By definition of η,
these sets are finite and we can define π ∈ ∆∗f (K × C
′ ×D′) by
∀(k, p, z) ∈ K ×∆(K)×∆f (∆(K)), π(k, (p, z), z) = η(z)z(p)p(k).
To canonical game Γ(π) will be denoted Γ̂(η), and its value vˆθ(η). If η = δz for some z ∈
∆f (∆(K)), we will use the shorter notations Γ̂(z) = Γ̂(δz) and vˆθ(z) for the value.
Informally, the game Γ̂(η) proceeds as follows: η is common knowledge, player 2 is informed
about the realization z of a random variable of law η (player 2 learns his beliefs). Then player
1 is informed about z (his opponent’s beliefs) and about the realization p of a random variable
of law z (his own beliefs). The state variable is finally selected according to p, but none of
the players observe it. If η = δz, for some z ∈ ∆f (∆(K)), then the set of initial signals for
player 2 is reduced to a singleton. In this case, player 1 receives a partial information about
the state, whereas player 2 only knows the joint distribution over the state and player 1’s
signal. Using these notations, Lemma 4.4 implies that if π, π′ ∈ ∆∗f (K ×N×N) are such that
Φ(π) = Φ(π′), we have that vθ(π) = vθ(π
′) = vˆθ(Φ(π)).
In order to study the regularity of the canonical value function, let us recall some properties
of the Wasserstein distance
Let (Z,d) be a compact metric space and Lip1(Z) the set of 1-Lipschitz functions on Z. The
function
d : ∆(Z)×∆(Z) : (µ, ν)→ sup
f∈Lip1(Z)
∫
Z
fdµ−
∫
Z
fdν
is a distance on ∆(Z) which makes ∆(Z) compact. Moreover, for all µ, ν ∈ ∆(Z)
d(µ, ν) = min
π∈P(µ,ν)
∫
Z×Z
|y − x|dπ(x, y),
where P(µ, ν) is the set of probabilities on Z×Z having for marginals µ and ν (see e.g. [14]).
If f is a bounded measurable function on Z, define f˜ : ∆(Z) → R by f˜(µ) =
∫
Z
fdµ.
Then
f˜ ∈ Lip1(∆(Z),d)⇔ f ∈ Lip1(Z).
In the following, ∆(K) is endowed with the ℓ1-norm induced by R
K and ∆(∆(K)) is
endowed with the Wasserstein metric d induced by the metric space (∆(K), ℓ1).
Lemma 5.2. Let η ∈ ∆f (∆f (∆(K))) and z ∈ ∆f (∆(K)). Then vˆθ(η) is linear on ∆f (∆f (∆(K)))
and the mapping on ∆(∆(K)), vˆθ(z) is 1-Lipschitz for the Wasserstein metric d.
Proof. The first assertion is immediate since by definition both players learn the realization
of η. Let z,z′ ∈ ∆f (∆(K)). By definition of the Wasserstein distance, there exists µ ∈
∆(∆(K)×∆(K)) such that the first marginal is z, the second is z′ and
d(z, z′) =
∫
∆(K)×∆(K)
‖p− p′‖1dµ(p, p
′).
We denote by Lµ(p|p
′) the conditional law of p given p′.
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Let σ ∈ Σ be a behavior strategy for player 1 in the game Γ̂(z). As in Section 2.2, σ(p)
denotes the strategy of player 1 conditionally on the signal p. Let us construct a general
strategy for P1 as follows. Let (Ω,P) = ([0, 1], dx) be the auxiliary probability space3 that
will be used as a “tossing coin”. The classical representation result of Blackwell-Dubins (see
[2]) asserts that there exists a jointly Borel-measurable map φ : Ω × ∆(∆(K)) 7→ ∆(K)
such that for all ν ∈ ∆(∆(K)), φ(·, ν) is a ν-distributed random variable. Therefore, the
map σ′(ω, p′) = σ(φ(ω, µ(p|p′))) defines a general strategy which is equivalent to a behavior
strategy by Kuhn’s theorem. It follows that
γθ(z
′, σ′, τ) =
∫
∆(K)×Ω
γθ(p
′, σ′(ω, p′), τ)dz′(p′)⊗ dP(ω),
=
∫
∆(K)
(∫
Ω
γθ(p
′, σ(φ(ω, µ(p|p′))), τ)dP(ω)
)
dz′(p′),
=
∫
∆(K)
(∫
∆(K)
γθ(p
′, σ(p), τ)dLµ(p|p
′)
)
dµ(p′),
=
∫
∆(K)×∆(K)
γθ(p
′, σ(p), τ)dµ(p, p′),
where the last equality follows from dz′(p′) = dµ(p′). Recall that by assumption g takes values
in [0, 1]. Consequently, γ(p, σ(p), τ) ∈ [0, 1], ∀p, σ, τ . Hence
|γθ(z
′, σ′, τ)− γθ(z, σ, τ)| ≤
∫
∆(K)×∆(K)
|γθ(p, σ(p), τ) − γθ(p
′, σ(p), τ)|dµ(p, p′),
≤
∫
∆(K)×∆(K)
‖p − p′‖1dµ(p, p
′),
= d(z, z′).
It follows that |vˆθ(z)− vˆθ(z
′)| ≤ d(z, z′), for any z, z′ ∈ ∆f (∆(K)).
Note that usually, the underlying space is ∆(K) with discrete metric on K and, in order
to prove that the value is 1-Lipschitz, we can use the same strategy in Γ(z) in Γ(z′). Here,
we cannot use directly σ. The state space is ∆f (∆(K)) with the norm 1 on ∆(K), and two
states may be close while having disjoint supports. Therefore an optimal strategy σ in Γ(z)
may have no sense in z′. The idea behind the above proof is to construct, given σ in Γ(z), a
strategy σ′ in Γ(z′) which behaves in z′ like σ in z.
Example 5.3. Assume that K = {k1, k2} and let z = δ 1
2
and z′ = 12δ 12−ǫ
+ 12δ 12+ǫ
be two
initial distributions in ∆f (∆(K) (where we identified ∆(K) and [0, 1]). A strategy in Γ(z) is
defined only at 12 since it can be modified elsewhere without altering the payoff. Therefore an
optimal strategy σ in in Γ(z) can play anything in 12 − ǫ and in
1
2 + ǫ since no regularity for
σ is required. The good way to use the proximity between z and z′ is to always play as if the
initial distribution was 12 . Here we have to define σ
′ such that for all z ∈ ∆(K), σ′(z) = σ(12 ).
3Using a continuum of alternatives is clearly unnecessary but allows to simplify the proof.
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Lemma 5.4 (Splitting procedure). The mapping vˆθ(z) is concave on ∆f (∆(K)).
Proof. We follow the same scheme as for games with incomplete information on one side (see
e.g. [5] Corollary 1.3 p.184). Let λ ∈ [0, 1] and let Y be a random variable with values in
{0, 1}, such that P(Y = 0) = λ. Let z, z′ ∈ ∆f (∆(K)). The random variable P is selected
according to the distribution z if Y = 0 and z′ if Y = 1, the state variable k1 is finally selected
according to p if P = p. Compare now the two following situations: on one hand, the game
with initial signals (Y, P ) for player 1 and nothing for player 2 and on the other hand the
game with initial signals (Y, P ) for player 1 and Y for player 2. These two distributions of
initial signals and states fulfill our assumptions and it’s clear that the value of the second is
less or equal than the value of the first for any evaluation θ ∈ ∆f (N
∗) since the set of behavior
strategies of player 2 in the second game is larger than in the first game. Translating this
inequality using vˆ, we deduce directly
vˆθ(δλz+(1−λ)z′) ≥ vˆθ(λδz + (1− λ)δz′) = λvˆθ(z) + 1− λvˆθ(z
′),
which proves the Lemma.
5.2 Auxiliary game G
Let X = ∆f (∆(K)) be the state space, which corresponds to player 2’s belief about player
1’s belief about the current state. It is a convex relatively compact subset of a normed vector
space and we are going to express the auxiliary game and the recursive formula on this state
space.
Let G be the stochastic game defined by
• the state space X = ∆f (∆(K)),
• the action space A = {f : ∆(K)→ ∆(I),measurable} for player 1,
• the action space B = ∆(J) for player 2,
• the payoff function G : X ×A×B → [0, 1] defined, for any z ∈ X by
G(z, a, b) =
∑
p∈supp(z)
∑
(i,j)∈I×J
b(j)a(p, i)g(p, i, j))z(p),
where supp(z) stands for the support of z,
• the transition function ℓ : X × A× B → ∆f (X) is defined as ℓ(z, a, b) = Φ(Q(z, a, b)),
where Q(z, a, b) ∈ ∆f ((K) × (∆(K) × C) × (D)) is the induced joint distribution of
(k2, (p, i1, c2), (j1, d2)) in the canonical game Γ̂(δz) where players play at the first stage
σ1 = a and τ1 = b. The sets C, D, K and supp(z) being finite and using assumptions
(A1) and (A2), we may consider Q as an element in ∆∗f (K × N× N).
Let us recall the definition of Choquet order on ∆f (X).
Definition 5.5. The order ≤ on ∆f (X) called (reversed) Choquet order is defined by the
relation
µ ≤ ν ⇔ For all continuous concave function on X, f˜(µ) ≤ f˜(ν).
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We aim to apply a weakened version of Renault [10] to the game G, thus let us first recall
the hypotheses of the Theorem as they appear in the original article.
Hypotheses 5.1.
H1) The map ℓ does not depend on b.
H2) X is a compact convex subset of a normed vector space,
H3) A and B are convex compact subsets of some topological vector spaces,
H4) (a 7→ G(z, a, b)) is concave upper semi-continuous ∀(z, b) ∈ X × B and (b 7→ G(z, a, b)) is
convex and lower semi-continuous ∀(z, a) ∈ X ×A.
H5) There exists a subset C of 1-Lipschitz functions containing φ(1, 0) such that for all f in C,
α ∈ [0, 1], the function φ(α, f) is in C, where φ(α, f) is defined by
∀z ∈ ∆f (X) φ(α, f)(z) = sup
a∈A
min
b∈B
{
αG(z, a, b) + (1− α)f˜(ℓ(z, a))
}
.
H6) The mapping a 7→ ℓ(z, a) is concave for the Choquet order and continuous.
H7) (Splitting assumption) Let z be a convex combination in ∆f (∆(K)), z =
∑S
s=1 λszs and
(as)s∈S be a family of actions in A
S. Then there exists a ∈ A such that
ℓ(z, a) ≥
∑
s∈S
λsℓ(zs, as) and min
b∈B
G(z, a, b) ≥
∑
s∈S
λsmin
b∈B
G(zs, as, b).
The main consequence of assumption (A3) is that player 2 cannot influence the transition
in the auxiliary game so the map ℓ does not depend on b, i.e.
∀(z, a) ∈ X ×A, ∀b, b′ ∈ B, ℓ(z, a, b) = ℓ(z, a, b′).
Thus (H1) is satisfied and from now on, we will work under the shorter notation l(z, a) for
l(z, a, b).
The hypotheses (H2,H3,H4,H6,H7) ensure the application of Sion’s theorem in several
steps of Renault’s proof. Here they are not all satisfied since, for example, the set A is
not compact. However, it is well known that adding some geometrical hypotheses allows to
weaken the topological assumptions in Sion’s theorem (see, for instance, Proposition A.8 in
Sorin’s monography [13]). For instance, if A is a convex set, B is a compact convex subset of
a topological vector space, (a 7→ G(z, a, b)) is concave ∀(z, b) ∈ X × B and (b 7→ G(z, a, b))
is convex and lower semi-continuous ∀(z, a) ∈ X × A, Sion’s result applies to the one-stage
game: the game G1(z) has a value. They can be replaced without altering the proof by the
following hypotheses.
Hypotheses 5.2.
H2’) X is a relatively compact convex subset of a normed vector space.
H3’) B is a convex compact subset of a topological vector space, A is a convex set.
H4’) (a 7→ G(z, a, b)) is concave ∀(z, b) ∈ X × B and (b 7→ G(z, a, b)) is convex and lower semi-
continuous ∀(z, a) ∈ X ×A.
H6’) The mapping a 7→ ℓ(z, a) is concave for the Choquet order.
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Assumption (H2′) is satisfied since the Wasserstein distance can be extended to a norm
on the space of finite signed measures. Moreover assumptions (H3′) and (H4′) are clearly
satisfied. Therefore, we need to prove (H6′) and (H7).
Lemma 5.6. The game G fulfills H6′ and H7.
Proof. Let z be a convex combination in X, z =
∑S
s=1 λszs and (as)s∈S be a family of actions
in AS . Denote µ(zs, as) ∈ ∆f (∆(K) × I) the joint law induced on ∆(K)× I by (zs, as). By
disintegration, there exists a ∈ A such that µ(z, a) =
∑
s∈S λsµ(zs, as). A first, note that
Q(z, a, b) =
∑
s∈S λsQ(zs, as, b).
Given (z, a, b), we consider the canonical game Γˆ(z). In this game, a pair (k, p) is chosen
according to the probability π ∈ ∆f (K ×∆(K)) defined by π(k, p) = p
kz(p) for all (k, p) ∈
K ×∆(K). Then, player 1 receives the signal c1 = p and player 2 receives no initial signal.
We associate to (a, b) a pair strategies for the first stage (σ1, τ1) by σ1(p) = a(p) and τ1 = b.
Then, Q(z, a, b) denotes the joint distribution of (k2, (p, i1, c2), (j1, d2)). Since the conditional
law of (k2, c2, d2) given (p, i1, j1) is q(p, i1, j1), it follows that Q(z, a, b) is bilinear with respect
to (µ(z, a), b) (with abusive notations).
Let ρ = Q(z, a, b) (resp. ρs = Q(zs, as, b)) and c
′ = (p, i1, c2) (resp. d
′ = (j1, d2)). Let
C ′ = (∪s∈Ssupp(zs))× I × C and D
′ = J ×D. By construction,
ℓ(z, a) = Φ(ρ) = Lρ(Lρ(Lρ(k2 | c
′) | d′)) =
∑
d′∈D′
ρ(d′)δLρ(Lρ(k2|c′)|d′).
Using Lemma 4.6, we have the following equality ρ-almost surely
Lρ(k2 | p, i1, c1) = F (p, i1, c2).
This implies that
Lρ(Lρ(k2 | c
′), d′) = Lρ(F (c
′), d′) ∈ ∆f (C
′′ ×D′)
where C ′′ = F (C ′). A similar equality holds with ρs instead of ρ for all s ∈ S. By definition
of l(z, a), we deduce that
ℓ(z, a) = Lρ(Lρ(F (c
′) | d′)) = Ψ(Lρ(F (c
′), d′)),
where Ψ is the disintegration map defined by
Ψ : ∆(C ′′ ×D′)→ ∆f (∆(C
′′)) : m→
∑
d′∈D′
m(d′)δLm(c′′|d′),
where Lm(c
′′|d′) denoted the conditional law of c′′ given d′. It was proved in Renault [10]
(Lemma 4.16) that Ψ is concave for the Choquet order on ∆f (∆(C
′′)). However, C ′′ being a
finite subset of ∆(K), ∆(C ′′) is identified as a compact convex subset of X. It follows easily
that the convex order on ∆f (∆(C
′′)) coincides with the order induced by the convex order
on ∆f (X).
We conclude that the first part of H7 holds since
l(z, a) = Ψ(
∑
s∈S
λsLρs(F (c
′), d′)) ≥
∑
s∈S
λsΨ(Lρs(F (c
′), d′)) =
∑
s∈S
λsl(zs, as).
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For the second part of H7, it is sufficient to note that (again with abusive notations) µ(z, a) 7→
G(z, a, b) is linear so that for all b ∈ B
G(z, a, b) =
∑
s∈S
λsG(zs, as, b),
which implies the result. Finally, in case zs = z for all s, the same arguments also imply
(H6′) since in this case one can choose a =
∑
s∈S λsas in the above proof.
The proof of the following proposition follows from Proposition 3.21 in Renault [10].
Proposition 5.7. Assuming (H1,H2′,H3′,H4′,H6′,H7), then for any θ ∈ ∆f (N
∗) and any
η ∈ ∆f (X), the game Gθ(η) has a value wθ(η) such that
∀z ∈ X,wθ(z) = sup
a∈A
min
b∈B
{θ1G(z, a, b) + (1− θ1)wθ+(ℓ(z, a))} , (5.1)
= min
b∈B
sup
a∈A
{θ1G(z, a, b) + (1− θ1)wθ+(ℓ(z, a))} , (5.2)
where θ+ is defined by θ+t =
θt+1∑
m≥2 θm
for t ≥ 1 whenever
∑
m≥2 θm > 0 and is defined
arbitrarily otherwise. Moreover, in Gθ(η), player 1 has ε-optimal Markov strategies for all
ε > 0 and player 2 has optimal Markov strategies.
In order to prove the last assumption (H5), we first prove that the value of the game
Gθ is equal to the canonical value function vˆθ. Since we proved that the canonical value is
1-Lipschitz, it will imply using the previous Proposition that the set of functions C = {vθ, θ ∈
∆f (N
∗)} satisfies (H5).
We now prove that the value functions of both games are the same. The proof is classic
and consists to show that both families of functions are linked by the same recursive formula.
Proposition 5.8. For all θ ∈ ∆f (N
∗) and for any z ∈ X, wθ(z) = vˆθ(z).
Corollary 5.9. The game G fulfills (H5).
Proof of Proposition 5.8. Notice first that vˆ1(z) = w1(z) for all z. This comes indeed almost
from the definition
vˆ1(z) = sup
σ1:∆(K)→∆(I)
inf
b∈∆(J)
∫
∆(K)
g(p, σ1(p), b)dz(p)
= sup
a∈A
min
b∈∆(J)
G(z, a, b)
= min
b∈∆(J)
sup
a∈A
G(z, a, b)
= w1(z).
It is enough to prove that w and vˆ satisfy the same recurrence formula. We will prove that vˆ
satisfies the recurrence formula in G, i.e.
vˆθ(z) = sup
a∈A
min
b∈B
θ1G(z, a, b) + (1− θ1)vˆθ+(ℓ(z, a))
= min
b∈B
sup
a∈A
θ1G(z, a, b) + (1− θ1)vˆθ+(ℓ(z, a)).
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We prove the recursive formula by induction on the greatest element in the support of θ. If
θ = δ1, it follows from the preceding equality. Fix now n ≥ 2, and assume that the proposition
is true for every θ supported by {1, ..., n − 1}. Let z ∈ ∆f (∆(K)). We first prove that player
1 can defend in Γˆθ(z) the quantity
min
b∈B
sup
a∈A
(θ1G(z, a, b) + (1− θ1)vˆθ+(ℓ(z, a))) .
Using the canonical representation Γ̂, vˆθ(z) = vθ(π) where π ∈ ∆f (K ×∆(K)×∆f (∆(K)))
is defined by
∀(k, p, x) ∈ K ×∆(K)×∆f (∆(K)), π(k, p, x) = p(k)z(p)1x=z.
Consider the game Γθ(π). Let ε > 0 and τ be a strategy of player 2. Denoting by b the law
induced by τ1, let a
∗ ∈ A an action which realizes the supremum up to ε in the expression
θ1G(z, a, b) + (1− θ1)vˆθ+(ℓ(z, a)).
Let σ∗ be an ε-optimal strategy in the game Γθ+(Q(z, a
∗, b)). Define then σ by σ1 = a
∗ and
for all n ∈ N∗, hIn = (p, i1, c2, ..., in−1, cn), σn(h
I
n) = σ
∗
n−1(c
′, h1,+n−1) where c
′ = (p, i1, c2) and
h1,+n−1 = (i2, c3, ..in−1, cn). We have
γθ(µ, σ, τ) = θ1G(z, a
∗, b) + (1− θ1)γθ+(Q(z, a
∗, b), σ∗, τ+),
where τ+ is a continuation strategy. Precisely, for all n ∈ N∗, τ+n−1(d
′, h2,+n−1) = τn(h
II
n ) with
h2,+n−1 = (j2, d3, .., jn−1, dn), h
II
n = (d
′, h2,+n−1) and d
′ = (j1, d2) is the “signal” for player 2 given
by Q(z, a∗, b).
Therefore, σ∗ and τ+ can be seen as behavior strategies in a new game with initial signals cor-
responding to the past history in the original game and since σ∗ is ε-optimal in Γ(Q(z, a∗, b)),
we have
γθ(µ, σ, τ) ≥ θ1G(z, a
∗, b) + (1− θ1)vθ+(Q(z, a
∗, b))− ε
≥ sup
a∈A
θ1G(z, a, b) + (1− θ1)vθ+(Q(z, a, b)) − 2ε
= sup
a∈A
θ1G(z, a, b) + (1− θ1)vˆθ+(ℓ(z, a)) − 2ε
≥ min
b∈B
sup
a∈A
θ1G(z, a, b) + (1− θ1)vˆθ+(ℓ(z, a)) − 2ε.
It follows that vˆθ(z) ≥ minb∈B supa∈A θ1G(z, a
∗, b) + (1− θ1)vˆθ+(ℓ(z, a)) by sending ε to zero.
Let us show that player 2 can defend supa∈Aminb∈B(θ1G(z, a, b)+(1−θ1)vˆθ+(ℓ(z, a)) in Γ(µ).
Fix a strategy σ of player 1 and let a = σ1, there exists b
∗ ∈ B achieving minbG(z, a, b). We
also choose τ∗ an optimal strategy for player 2 in the game Γθ+(Q(z, a, b
∗)). This defines a
strategy τ such that
γµθ (σ, τ) = θ1G(z, a, b
∗) + (1− θ1)γ
Q(z,a,b∗)
θ+
(σ+, τ∗)
≤ θ1G(z, a, b
∗) + (1− θ1)vθ+(Q(z, a, b
∗))
= θ1G(z, a, b
∗) + (1− θ1)vˆθ+(ℓ(z, a))
= min
b∈B
θ1G(z, a, b) + (1− θ1)vˆθ+(ℓ(z, a)).
Thus vˆθ(z) ≤ supa∈Aminb∈B(θ1G(z, a, b) + (1 − θ1)vˆθ+(ℓ(z, a)). Finally, since the maxmin is
always smaller than the minmax, all the intermediate inequalities are equalities.
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5.3 Existence of the uniform value
Let us at first recall the first main result proved in [10] which holds under our set of weakened
assumptions.
Theorem 5.10 (Renault(2012)). Assume that H1,H ′2,H ′3,H ′4,H5,H ′6,H7 hold. Then
for every initial distribution η ∈ ∆f (X), the game has a uniform value w
∗(η). Moreover
player 1 can guarantee w∗(η) with a Markov strategy:
∀ǫ > 0, ∃σ ∈ ΣM ,∃N0 ∈ N, ∀N ≥ N0 ∀τ
′ ∈ τ , γN (η, σ, τ
′) ≥ w∗(η) − ǫ.
and we have w∗(η) = infn≥1 supm≥0 wm,n(η).
In order to conclude the proof, we show that both players can guarantee
v∗(π) = inf
n≥1
sup
m≥0
vm,n(π),
where vm,n(π) = vθm,n(π) and θm,n is the uniform law between stage m and m+ n.
The game G(z) satisfies assumptions H1, ...,H7′ so it has a uniform value given by
w∗(z) = inf
n≥1
sup
m≥0
wm,n(z).
And by proposition 5.8, the value in G and in the reduced game are equal, so if π ∈ ∆∗f (K ×
N×N) we have
v∗(π) = inf
n≥1
sup
m≥0
vm,n(π) = inf
n≥1
sup
m≥0
vˆm,n(Φ(π)) = inf
n≥1
sup
m≥0
wm,n(Φ(π)) = w
∗(Φ(π)),
Thus player 1 can guarantee v∗(π) in G(Φ(π)) with a Markov strategy. Let us check that he
can guarantee v∗(π) in the game Γ̂(Φ(π)) or equivalently in Γ(π).
Proposition 5.11. Any Markovian strategy σ̂ of player 1 in G∞(z) induces a strategy σ in
Γˆ∞(z) guaranteeing the same amount.
Proof. Let σ̂ be a behavior strategy in G∞(z). Let us describe the strategy σ. Player 1 plays
at the first round in Γ∞(z) the mixed action σ̂1(z)(p) where p is his initial signal. Then, at
round n, he plays the mixed action σ̂n(yn)(xn). That this strategy is a well-defined strategy
follows from Lemma 4.9.
It remains to prove that this strategy guarantees the same quantity as σ̂. Let us fix n ∈ N∗,
we will prove that there exists a best reply τ˜ to σ in Γ̂n(z) which can be seen as a strategy τˆ
in Gθ(z) and such that
γθ(z, σ, τ˜ ) = γ̂θ(z, σ̂, τ̂).
We will proceed by backward induction. Let us fix a best reply τ to σ in Γ̂θ(z). We will
construct a strategy τ˜ which depends at stage m on hIIm only through ym. Recall that σ is
fixed so that ym(h
II
m ) can be computed by player 2. At first let us replace τn by
τ˜n(yn) = EPzστ [τ(h
II
n ) | yn].
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Note that this conditional expectation depends on the strategies σ, τ up to stage n − 1. Let
us prove that the payoff at the last stage n is not modified.
EPzστ [g(kn, in, jn)] = EPzστ [EPzστ [g(kn, in, jn) | h
I
n, h
II
n ]]
= EPzστ [γ1(xn, σn(yn, xn), τn(h
II
n ))]
= EPzστ [EPzστ [γ1(xn, σn(yn, xn), τn(h
II
n )) | h
II
n ]]
= EPzστ [
∫
γ1(x, σn(yn, x), τn(h
II
n ))dyn[x]]
= EPzστ [EPzστ [
∫
γ1(x, σn(yn, x), τn(h
II
n ))dyn[x] | yn]]
= EPzστ [
∫
γ1(x, σn(yn, x),EPzστ [τn(h
II
n ) | yn])dyn[x]]
= EPzστ [
∫
γ1(x, σn(yn, x), τ˜n(yn))dyn[x]]
= EPz
σ,(τ1,...,τn−1,τ˜n)
[g(kn, in, jn)].
The above equations show that the expected payoff at stage n when player 2 is playing the
best reply (τ1, ..., τn−1, τ˜n) against σ is a function of σ and of the law of yn. Assume now that
at step m, we have proved that there exists a best reply to σ of player 2 such that the sum of
expected payoffs for the stages m + 1, ..., n is a function of σ and of the law of (ym+1, .., yn)
only. We can replace τm(h
II
m ) by τ˜m(ym) = EPzστ [τm(h
II
m ) | ym] without modifying the expected
payoff of stage m with the same argument as above. Using assumption (A3), Lemma 4.9 and
the definition of σ, the law of (ym+1, ...yn) is not modified by this operation which proves that
this modified strategy is still a best reply to σ.
Secondly, we prove that Player 2 can guarantee v∗(π) by splitting the stage in blocks and
playing on each block separately since he has no influence on the transition. The following
results are quite similar to the corresponding ones proved in Renault [10] and are reproduced
here since their proofs are very short.
Lemma 5.12. For every π ∈ ∆∗f (K×C
′×D′), n ≥ 1 and m ≥ 1, ∀ τ1, ..., τm, ∃ τm+1, ..., τm+n
such that the strategy τ1, ..., τm, ..., τm+n of player 2 is optimal in the game Γm,n.
Proof. Let π ∈ ∆(K×C ′×D′), n ≥ 1 andm ≥ 0, and τ1, ..., τm such that τi : D
′×(J×D)i−1 →
∆(J). We define T ∗ the subset strategies of player 2 which start with τ1, ..., τm and we consider
the game with the evaluation θm,n and the set of strategies Σ and T
∗. It can be seen as the
mixed extension of a finite game, thus the value exists and will be denoted v∗m,n(π). Since
the set of strategies of player 2 is smaller than T , we have vm,n(π) ≤ v
∗
m,n(π). But using the
same method as for proving the recursive formula of Proposition 5.8, for any σ, we can build
a strategy which defends vm,n(π). Both values are therefore equal and any optimal strategy
in the restricted game satisfies the conclusion of the lemma.
Proposition 5.13. For every π ∈ ∆∗f (K × C
′ × D′), player 2 can guarantee v∗(π) in the
game Γ∞(π).
Proof. We prove that for all n ∈ N, Player 2 can guarantee the payoff supm≥0 vm,n(p). Let
n ∈ N be a number of stages, then for each L ∈ N we split the game of length nL in L blocks
of length n: B1, ..., BL. We define the strategy τ
∗ by induction on the block.
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Let τ be an optimal strategy in Γ1,n(π) then we set τ
∗
i = τi for all i ∈ {1, .., n}. Once
we have constructed τ∗1 , ..., τ
∗
nl for some 1 ≤ l ≤ L − 1, we define the game Γ
#
nL+1,n(π)
where the player 2 has to play τ∗i for all i ≤ nl. We have v
#
nL+1,n(π) = vnL+1,n(π) using
the preceding Lemma. Let τ be an optimal strategy in Γ#nL+1,n(π) and set τ
∗
i = τi for all
i ∈ {nL+ 1, ..., (n + 1)L}. We have
γLn(σ, τ
∗) =
1
nL
E
π
στ∗
(
Ln∑
m=0
g(km, im, jm)
)
=
1
nL
L−1∑
d=0
E
π
στ∗
 (d+1)n∑
m=dn+1
g(km, im, jm)

≤
1
L
L−1∑
d=0
vdn+1,n(π) ≤
1
L
L−1∑
d=0
sup
m≥0
vm,n(π)
≤ sup
m≥0
vm,n(π).
The payoff being bounded, we deduce that this strategy guarantees vm,n(π). Finally, Player
2 can guarantee the minimum on n ∈ N, infn∈N supm≥0 vm,n(π) = v
∗(π).
Since each player can guarantee v∗(π), the game has a uniform value given by v∗(π) which
concludes the proof of Theorem 2.3.
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